This article discusses Kant’s reception of main-streams of Ancient Philosophy, namely Plato-Platonism, Aristotle, Epicurus, Stoicism and Skepticism (Sextus Empiricus), together with the critical transformation of central concepts (for ex ample ‚idea‘, the ‚good‘, ‚virtue‘ and so forth) of these traditions.

Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, Epicurus, Skepticism

I start from what I call Ptolemaism, that is, the objection according to which Kant is more akin to Ptolemy and his geocentrism than to Copernicus – an objection common among the proponents of neorealism (Meillassoux, Ferraris, Gabriel). I argue that this objection also points to an anthropocentrism, subjectivism, and even a speciesism in Kant’s proposal regarding the conditions that make knowl edge possible, essentially at the core of his transcendental approach to analyzing knowledge. Besides clearing up the fundamental misunderstanding of this inter pretation, based on Copernicus’ work and Kant’s own words, I will attempt to show the close connection that the philosopher himself saw with the astronomer, and how this extended to crucial passages in his Critique of Pure Reason, like the Transcendental Deduction, especially in its 1787 reformulation. Finally, in chal lenging the anthropocentrist objection, I unveil the meaning of the references to human nature and knowledge and how, in the author’s project, these references involve the transcendental perspective – this time clarified alongside the observa tional strategy of the revolutionary Copernican perspective.

Kant, Copernicus, Transcendental Deduction, Neorealism, Anthro pocentrism

Kant holds Newton’s scientific achievement in the highest esteem, but distances himself from Newton’s thought in several respects. As is well-known, Kant rejects Newton’s view of space as absolute; this rejection may explain the absence of New ton from Kant’s most prominent discussion of physics’ attainment of the “sure path” of science. Kant also charges Newton with failing to own up to his own metaphysical commitments regarding the immediacy of attraction and the neces sity of attractive force for matter. Kant characterizes Newton’s view of space and his matter theory as “mathematical”, in contrast to the “metaphysical” approach Kant favors. These labels can be traced to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, and Kant appears more firmly committed to his approach in the case of space than of matter. Finally, Kant’s engagement with Newton is shown to predate his Critical writings and to extend to Newton’s optical and mathematical writings.

Kant, Newton, Space, Matter Theory, Hypotheses

This paper focuses on John Keill’s influence on Kant’s pre-critical thought, as well as on his early understanding of Newtonianism. The first section reconstructs the spread of Newtonianism in Königsberg during Kant’s university years. The sec ond deals with Keill’s method of philosophizing and its impact on Kant’s method ological reflections in his early scientific writings. The third and fourth examine how Keill’s conceptions of inverse square law, solidity, extension, and divisibility helped Kant find his own eclectic way in combining metaphysics and mathematics.

Kant, Keill, Newton, Metaphysics, Mathematics

This article argues that Kant was engaged in an ongoing critical appropriation of Wolffian faculty psychology throughout his career. It provides an overview of Wolffian faculty psychology, emphasizing the distinction between rational psy chology and empirical psychology; the relationship between the soul’s power of representation and the cognitive faculties; and the criteria Wolff uses to distin guish sensibility and the understanding. It also tracks Kant’s appropriation of Wolffian faculty psychology through his published writings and the transcripts of his lectures from the 1760s and 1770s. Although he modifies and transforms many of the central doctrines of Wolff’s faculty psychology during the pre-critical peri od, the article concludes that many of the positions Kant defends in the Critique of Pure Reason are still indebted to Wolffian faculty psychology.

Immanuel Kant, Christian Wolff, Empirical Psychology, Rational Psychology, Metaphysics

The purpose of this article is to highlight some possible sources of Kant’s theory of empirical imagination, with particular reference to the distinction between its voluntary and involuntary use. It will be shown that in Kant the discussion of the subject is not limited to the mere repetition or extension of Baumgarten’s concep tion, but is affected by other influences, unified by the importance they attach to the psycho-physiological investigation of mental phenomena. Through the analy sis of the reflections and the transcripts of the anthropology lectures, the contri bution stresses how, not only Platner, but also Meier’s Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften may have offered relevant insights to the first elabo ration of the above distinction. Moreover, the Kantian conception of fantasy, as involuntary imagination, is compared with some passages of Tetens’ Philoso phische Versuche, before being described in its peculiar characters.

Kant, Imagination, Free will, Meier, Tetens

Kant agrees with Hume that an agent’s voluntary actions must be seen as caus ally determined by its character and beliefs. Yet Kant also affirms, contra Hume, that it is possible to assert, even at the point at which an agent commits an immor al act, that the agent could have acted otherwise, i.e., could have acted for the sake of morality. An attempt is made to explain Kant’s defence of his position and to assess its plausibility in the light of Hume’s alternative theory and some claimed f indings of neuroscience. 

Hume, Kant, Causality, Freedom, Phenomena/Noumena

Eighteenth-century German writers with broad interests in natural history, and in particular, in the kind of ethnographic reports typically included in travel and expedition narratives, had to be able to access and read the original reports or they had to work with translations. The translators of these reports were, moreover, typically forced more than usual into the role of interpreter. This was especially the case when it came to accounts wherein vocabulary did not exist or was at least not settled, and more importantly where scientific understanding was uncertain or altogether lacking, a situation that could only make the creation of semantic categories all the more significant. With this state of affairs in mind, this essay concentrates on Immanuel Kant’s work to develop a specialised racial vocabulary, and does so in a manner that reveals the importance of Buffon’s account of varia tion as a resource for Kant, even as Kant sought to position the new vocabulary as an improved template for transforming taxonomy or Naturbeschreibung into a genuine historical science or Naturgeschichte.

Buffon, Kant, Species, Race, Natural History